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India unleashed
Corporations in the developed world increasingly see India as a high-growth market and
its companies as acquirers of their assets, global competitors, partners for enhancing
the competitiveness of their global value chain and a source of new energy and dreams
for the world economy. How did this all happen? Nirmalya Kumar shares the essence of
what he learned from 10 trips to India to interview more than 30 CEOs and top
executives who are unleashing the new global power of Indian firms.
Published in Business Strategy Review, Volume 20, Issue 1, March 2009, Pages 4-15.
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8616.2009.00573.x
Last November, the world of space explorationtook another step forward when a two-yearprogramme to find out more about the nature
of the moon’s surface climaxed when a box-shaped
probe landed on the lunar south pole. According to
a November 15, 2008, news report by Associated
Press, the country that launched the probe rejoiced
“at joining an elite club by planting its flag on the
moon as the country’s space agency released the
first pictures of the cratered surface taken by its
maiden lunar mission”.
But an expanded scientific collection of lunar
photos wasn’t the only thing that was new. As AP
continued, “The box-shaped probe was painted with
India’s saffron, white and green flag, sparking
celebrations in the country that is striving to
become a world power. ‘The tricolor has landed,’ the
Hindustan Times said in a banner headline, while
The Asian Age proclaimed ‘India is big cheese.’”
Exactly right. With that lunar mission, India
joined the ranks of the US, Russia, the European
Space Agency, Japan and China. It financed its
scientific programme with the largesse derived from
a decade of robust economic growth – in fact, by
2008, India’s economy had become so strong that it
was investing more capital in other countries than
the reverse. Indian foreign investment in the
financial year closing March 31, 2007, exceeded
the cumulative total foreign investment by Indian
companies in the 58 years between its
independence in 1947 and 2005. In 2007, the
Indian corporate sector was involved in $60 billion
of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity, up 109
per cent over 2006. While it was the flag of India
that adorned its first lunar spacecraft, one could say
that the capsule itself was built under the aegis of
India Inc.
Ironically, what India achieved for the first time
on the moon happened while everyone on Earth
(India included) was struggling with economic
setbacks not seen since the 1930s. Just to give you
a feel for the extent of the market tumult, India’s
famed automaker, Tata Motors, saw its stock price
fall by 80 per cent in less than a year. One could
cite similar dour statistics for many Indian
corporations.
But India is a country that plans to soar in good
times and bad, and the story of its explorations of
the moon is a perfect metaphor for the growing
presence of India on the world stage. The AP says
that India is planning to launch a lunar rover in
2011, followed (some hope) soon thereafter with a
manned mission. Exciting stuff. But, in many ways,
what India has accomplished – and plans to – in the
world of business is even more exciting. In many
ways, India’s business journey has just begun; and
the global marketplace will never be the same
because of it.
Inexhaustible imagination
If one considers the staggering development of
Indian commercial success over time, it is a
magnificent achievement for a culture that was
always willing to dream (and do) more. One cannot
really grasp the potential for Indian business unless
one also understands the roots of Indian enterprise.
The rise of India Inc. can be summarized in four
words: from local to global.
The transformation of Indian companies from
domestic to global players went through three
phases. In the pre-reform phase, prior to 1991,
Indian business was under shackles, first from
British colonialism and later (post-independence)
from socialist policies. In the second phase, post-
1991 economic reforms necessitated a decade-long
corporate restructuring to make companies globally
competitive. Now, in the third phase, Indian
companies are increasingly going global. Here’s a
quick historical overview.
1947–1991: Rich owners, poor
companies
Indian business from the country’s independence 
in 1947 until the economic liberalization
programme of 1991 was uniquely shaped by the
constraints imposed by three factors: Indian culture,
British rule and post-independence socialist
policies. It resulted in a domestically focused,
unique and somewhat perverse Indian business
model that left companies in poor shape but their
owners wealthy.
The wonderful author and short story writer Anita
Desai certainly was familiar with the business world;
her father, after all, was a Bengali businessman.
Thus, I found a comment by her both intriguing 
and compelling (and spot on): “India is a curious
place that still preserves the past, religions, and 
its history. No matter how modern India becomes, 
it is still very much an old country.”
Indian culture Change is slow in ancient cultures
like India’s, and key aspects of India’s cultural and
social history (especially Hinduism, practiced by 85
per cent of Indians) played an influential role in
shaping the traditional Indian business model. A
crucial element of Hinduism, the system of castes
and sub-castes, functioned like medieval European
guilds. It ensured division of labour and provided for
training of apprentices. Over time, the caste system
became a source of hierarchical differentiation in
Indian society, in which traders (Vysyas) and those
engaged in business were placed above only the
lowest Sudra caste, but below the priests
(Brahmins) and warriors (Kshatriyas). Furthermore,
as the four-caste system fragmented into hundreds
of sub-castes, it restricted people from changing
their occupation or aspiring to a higher caste.
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Scholars believe that the caste system
throttled initiative, instilled ritual and restricted the
market. It also played two vital roles in shaping the
Indian business model. First, respect for higher
caste members was unquestioned. This laid the
foundation for deference to one’s superiors in the
workplace. Typically, Indian organizations were, and
many still are, hierarchical and feudalistic. Second,
entrepreneurial aspirations were not encouraged. In
fact, an acceptance of the natural order of one’s
position in society meant that, except for those
belonging to the trader class, Indians did not aspire
to be entrepreneurs.
Then there was the cultural influence of the joint
family, a unit consisting of the patriarch, his
younger brothers and their children and
grandchildren, living together under a single roof.
The family pooled their resources and invested in
business ventures with the goal of allowing each
member to earn a respectable livelihood. In the
Western world, nepotism holds unflattering
connotations because competing on merit is a
strongly held virtue. In contrast, Indian family
business held responsibility for and respect of
family members as superior norms. The entire
family participated in the business. 
British rule British rule unfortunately stifled and
distorted India’s trade with the rest of the world,
barring Indian industry from competing with the
British, especially in global markets, and thus
forcing Indians to focus either on developing cheap
raw material for British factories or on distributing
British products in India. Although the British
developed transport, postal and modern legal
systems in India, this infrastructure supported the
management of Indian resources for British gain.
For example, by 1830, India’s thriving textile
industry had been all but destroyed. By the mid-
1800s, India was importing one quarter of all
British cotton textile exports. In the decades that
followed, the British compelled Indian farmers to
grow indigo, cotton and wheat for export to Britain.
During British rule, imported products received
tariff and tax benefits while Indian industry was
suppressed. The British focus on its interests
hindered the development of a free-trade
environment in which Indian multinational
companies, similar to those sprouting elsewhere in
the world in the late 1800s and early 1900s, could
be born.
Yet, beyond the obvious benefit of imposing
British as the national corporate language, British
rule conferred an unintended benefit for Indian
companies when they finally decided to enter global
markets. Early in their rule, the British realized that
it was impossible to transplant enough of their own
citizens to India. Instead, Thomas Macaulay, who
was advising the governor general of India, argued in
1834 that the British must “train a class of people
Indian in blood and colour but British in taste, in
opinions, in morals, and in intellect.” Even today,
“Macaulay’s children” refers to Indians who adopt
Western culture as a lifestyle. Though usually used
with a negative connotation, this process meant that
when the British did leave, a significant segment of
Indians in the corporate sector had superficially
adopted British habits (for example, dressing in
well-tailored suits, using a knife and fork) that
allowed them to interact with Westerners with
relative ease. This was especially true for the Indian
elites at the time of the country’s independence,
most of whom had been educated in the UK. At
times, these Indians even tried to outdo the British
at their own game, and it is still jokingly said that
the last British man on earth will be an Indian.
Post-independence When India became
independent, large Indian firms could have adopted
an Indian language or Indian national dress as
organization-wide practices but chose not to do so.
Instead, most Indian firms with national presence
adopted the British language and British-Indian
work practices that were considered more neutral.
This allowed them to avoid having to negotiate the
conflict between the large regional and language
differences that existed within the workforce.
Because of British rule, Indians learned to manage
the duality of their work and home lives. At work,
the managers were all similarly “British”; at home,
they reverted to the language, dress and food of the
region from which they originated. But the factor that
most affected India Inc. after the country became
an independent state was its skew toward socialism.
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If one considers the staggering development of 
Indian commercial success, it is a magnificent
achievement for a culture that was always willing to 
dream (and do) more.
At the end of colonial rule, India inherited an
economy that was one of the poorest in the world.
India suffered from one of the world’s lowest life
expectancies and a largely illiterate population. 
By 1950, Britain’s legacy of profound structural
economic issues – a stagnant economy, stalled
industrial development and an agricultural base that
could not feed the rapidly accelerating population –
proved a significant challenge for India’s first prime
minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
Influenced by the British Fabian Society, Nehru
adopted the socialist economic model, hoping for
strong growth through a centralized economy to
increase the standard of living among India’s
poorest and to encourage the growth of critical
manufacturing and heavy industries. Tragically, this
earnestly romantic vision of the socialist ideal
proved wholly inadequate in dealing with the real
challenges in the Indian economy.
In India’s centrally planned economy, government
planners determined the output allowed in each
industry because they did not want to see “over-
investment” and “waste” in a country with limited
resources. Therefore, companies needed licenses for
everything – from setting up a business and expanding
capacity to laying off workers and closing down a
factory. As a result, the central bureaucrats in Delhi
became enormously powerful and were popularly
known as “License Raj”, translated as “license rule”.
Licenses were so precious that to obtain one you
needed either a connection to a major politician 
(for example, the only new automobile
manufacturing license granted between 1950 and
1980 was to Sanjay Gandhi’s Maruti Udyog) or the
ability to pay a large bribe, or both. The large family
business houses learned how to game the system 
by using their connections to get follow-up on their
files, organize bribes and win licenses. They used
the licensing process to foreclose competition, 
often by applying for a competitor’s license; the
competitor’s application would then be rejected
because industry capacity had already been
licensed. Then the company with the license would
simply sit on the license without using it to build
any capacity.
Most of the licenses granted were for major
industrial and infrastructure projects. Setting up
these operations required having a foreign
multinational company build a large plant since
these capabilities typically did not exist within
India. International vendors would be invited to
compete for these capital projects. One of the
conditions for being awarded the order (which, of
course, would not appear in the contract) was that
the foreign supplier would fully or at least
substantially reimburse the promoter’s initial equity
investment by placing funds directly into the
promoter’s offshore and undeclared bank account.
As a result, the entire project would be completed
without requiring the promoter to have any of his
own money in play but allowing complete
management control despite shareholdings of less
than 10 per cent.
A second bonanza to the established Indian
business houses accrued in 1973 when the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was passed. The
government restricted foreign companies from
holding more than a 40 per cent share of joint
ventures. This required foreign multinationals to
rapidly dilute their holdings in their Indian
subsidiaries. Since most foreign companies were
uninterested in minority shares, they began looking
for the exits. Not surprisingly, established Indian
business houses were able to acquire these Indian
assets of foreign companies, especially British
companies, at throwaway prices. Often these
transfers were done at 10-to-20 cents on a dollar.
The prevailing policies led to concentrated family
ownership of Indian business assets, exercised
through pyramids, with significant divergence
between the promoter family’s almost complete
control rights and typically much smaller cash flow
rights. Institutional gaps meant that new ventures
by established business groups could not only rely
on capital infusion from the group but also benefit
from the group brand name, internal talent transfers
and reduced contractual costs.
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Nehru ponders
To grow, Indian business groups had little
choice but to pursue unrelated diversification. 
For example, the Birla Group operated in diverse
industries such as automobiles, cement, dairy,
electricity, jute, newspapers, plastics, sanitary ware,
shipping, steel, sugar, tea and textiles. Diversified
Indian groups relied on “institutional relatedness”,
a dense network of ties with dominant institutions,
which allowed them to exploit nonmarket forms of
capital such as social, political and reputational.
Unlike the results for American companies, in
which diversification resulted in lower returns, there
was a diversification premium for Indian companies
during this post-independence era. 
Unfortunately, because of the omnipresence of
state planning, controls and regulations, Indian
business focused on dealing with the state
planners. Indian companies were characterized by
poor quality and productivity, neglect of customer
needs and short-sighted attitudes toward product
development. The widely quoted observation of
Indian business at the end of this era was “Indian
businesses may be poor, but their owners are rich.”
1991–2001: Becoming globally
competitive
In 1991, India suffered a major economic crisis
from the combined effects of oil price shocks
(resulting from the 1990 Gulf War), the collapse of
the Soviet Union (a major trading partner and
source of foreign aid), and a sharp depletion of its
foreign exchange reserves (caused mainly by large
and continuing government budget deficits). Also in
1991, India had to service the country’s $70 billion
external debt, which had trebled over the previous
decade, as well as pay for the burgeoning costs of
imports, especially oil. The country’s foreign
exchange reserves dipped below $1 billion, barely
enough to pay for two-to-three weeks of imports. In
addition, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989, the viability of socialism as an
alternative model to capitalism had crumbled before
the world’s eyes.
The government was forced to accept that the
socialist model that had prevailed since
independence had to be abandoned. Fortunately,
the Indian government had in place what is now
considered an economic dream team of Manmohan
Singh (finance minister), P. Chidambaram
(commerce minister) and Montek Singh Ahluwalia
(commerce secretary). To reform the economy, the
government adopted several new policies:
● Industrial licensing was drastically reduced,
leaving only 18 industries subject to licensing
● Import tariffs were reduced from an average of 85
per cent to 25 per cent, combined with a rollback
of quantitative controls on imports
● The rupee was devalued and made convertible on
the trade account
● The Controller of Capital Issues, the office that
decided the prices and number of shares firms
could issue, was abolished
● Indian firms were permitted to raise capital on
international markets by issuing global depository
receipts (GDRs)
● India’s equity markets were opened to investment
by foreign institutional investors
● Procedures for foreign direct investment
approvals were streamlined and, in at least 35
industries, allowed for automatic approval of
projects within the limits for foreign participation
● Foreign direct investment was encouraged by
increasing the maximum limit on the share of
foreign capital in joint ventures from 40 to 51 per
cent, with 100 per cent foreign equity permitted
in priority sectors.
The effects of the reforms were immediate and
dramatic. The GDP growth rate between 1950 and
1991 had averaged between two and three per cent
per year; since 1991 it has averaged about six per
cent per year. More recently, since 2004, growth
has exceeded eight per cent. The foreign exchange
reserves that had dipped to a low of $1 billion are
now approaching $300 billion.
More importantly, the economic growth has had 
a significant impact on the reduction of poverty
levels. Within two decades, between 1985 and
2005, the percentage of the population living on 
a dollar a day was reduced by almost half, from 
93 to 54 per cent. Based on that reduction, it is
estimated that 431 million fewer Indians live in
extreme poverty today. McKinsey expects Indian
incomes to triple over the next two decades, lifting
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At the end of colonial rule, India inherited an economy that
was one of the poorest in the world. India suffered from
one of the world’s lowest life expectancies and a largely
illiterate population.
another 290 million people out of poverty and
boosting India’s middle class to 580 million. More
optimistic surveys show even greater progress on
poverty reduction, with estimates as low as 319
million Indians currently living at under a dollar 
a day.
In the 1990s, India was one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world in terms of
productivity, with average productivity levels
doubling every 16 years. It was estimated in 2001
that, if that pace of growth were maintained, by
2066 India would reach the real GDP per capita
level of the United States prevailing in 2001. The
contrast with the pace of growth before 1980 was
remarkable, when average Indian productivity levels
were doubling only every 50 years. At the 1980s
rate, India would have expected to approach
America’s 2001 GDP per capita level not in 2066,
but in 2250.
Corporate restructuring The post-1991 reforms
changed the environment for Indian business.
Indian companies realized that the traditional
Indian business model appropriate for “sheltered
firms” had to be abandoned. First, the liberalization
of industrial licensing meant that new domestic
players could easily emerge in what were previously
tightly controlled industrial sectors. As a result,
companies went through a tough corporate
restructuring programme to enhance domestic
competitiveness in the face of a more aggressive
marketplace. Second, as import tariffs were cut 
and entry barriers for foreign companies were
reduced, international players began to view India
as a potential market. Subsequently, they brought 
to India their world-class products and services. 
This forced even Indian firms with no global
ambitions to become globally competitive to survive
foreign competition.
The transformation of Indian companies and
business houses post-1991 was a crucial step in
preparing them for the global marketplace. And, 
not surprisingly, some of them have become global
players. The decade-long corporate restructuring
programme had four essential elements: cleaning
the balance sheet, improving competitiveness,
focusing on core businesses and strengthening
management.
Cleaning the balance sheet The balance sheets 
of most Indian companies in 1991 were poor.
Established companies had the ability to raise
money from banks, and many had done so at
relatively favourable rates. These borrowed funds
exceeded what the business itself could utilize.
Instead, the money was placed in an investment
portfolio and invested in other group companies. 
As mentioned earlier, these cross-holdings allowed
the ultimate promoters of these companies to
control a vast network of group companies with 
very little of their own funds. The other shareholders 
in these companies disliked this arrangement 
but could do almost nothing about it as the
regulatory regime did not empower them or protect
their interests. 
As the Securities and Exchange Board of India
(SEBI) began adopting reforms in corporate
governance and empowering small shareholders
along the lines of the American stock markets,
companies were forced to shed these investments
and cross-holdings. Given the complexity and
ubiquity of corporate cross-holdings, their
disentanglement was a time-consuming process.
But every major Indian business group had to
address it.
The balance sheets also suffered from substantial
distortions in the valuation of assets. Many firms
had assets with inflated values on their books.
These needed to be recorded at their real market
value. On the other hand, certain other assets on
the books – usually property, cars and art – were
valued much below their market price. The logic
here was that these undervalued assets would at
some stage be sold to the promoters at book value.
It was essentially a mechanism for transferring
funds from the firm to the owners with the
controlling interest at the cost of the minority
shareholders. Large Indian companies had to go
through a painful process of cleaning up their
balance sheets to bring the assets in line with
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More importantly, the economic growth has had a
significant impact on the reduction of poverty levels.
Within two decades, between 1985 and 2005, the
percentage of the population living on a dollar a day was
reduced by almost half.
market values. The boom in property and the
resulting revaluation to reflect rising prices helped
companies write down the overvalued assets.
Strong balance sheets were essential for
companies to attract new share capital from
domestic and foreign sources. This infusion of
capital helped reduce the historically high debt-
to-equity ratios in Indian firms. More critically, 
it was needed to make the necessary capital
investments to become competitive in the new
deregulated marketplace. Finally, funds were also
required to ramp up capacity to keep pace with 
the rapid domestic growth that followed the
liberalization programme.
Improving competitiveness Under the protection of
the benign environment pre-1991 and without the
discipline of a tough competitive marketplace,
Indian companies had become bloated. Costs,
productivity and quality had all become victims as
companies could simply pass on inefficiencies to
the consumer. Companies had little choice but to
seek dramatic improvements on these fronts if they
were to survive in the new marketplace.
To reduce costs and improve productivity,
companies became more demanding of their
suppliers and employees. Traditionally, Indian firms,
because of high import duties, had relied
exclusively on Indian suppliers and frequently
substituted the available cheap labour for
sophisticated capital equipment. Baba Kalyani, who
led the transformation of Bharat Forge from a
labour-intensive to a technology-intensive
manufacturing firm, observed the conditions that
forced firms to make inappropriate choices: “You
waited a year for an equipment-import license, got
less than you wanted, then paid an 80 per cent
import duty.” Even computing the import duties was
a nightmare. For example, a new Burroughs
computer imported by Tata Consultancy Services
(TCS) in 1974 attracted a tariff of 101 per cent,
including import duty, auxiliary duty, countervailing
duty and a levy to help pay for the war in Bangladesh.
In family-controlled firms, suppliers were
frequently relatives of the promoter. The promoter
had set them up in business to allow them to make
a decent living. The procurement managers were
keenly aware of these relationships and therefore
did not lean too hard on the suppliers with respect
to prices, quality standards or delivery reliability.
The new competitive environment forced, and
liberalization allowed, firms to access the global
supply chain and obtain inputs on a par with global
standards at competitive prices.
Most Indian firms were overstaffed with strong,
militant unions that protected the employees. 
In the new environment, companies began
downsizing the workforce by providing incentives 
for workers to retire early. In addition, even unions
began to be more flexible in the private negotiating
rooms. Union bosses initially realized that layoffs
were inevitable, and later that jobs were available
elsewhere as the economy was rapidly expanding.
For example, at Mahindra & Mahindra in 1991, 
it took 1,230 workers to manufacture 70 engines 
a day; in 1994 productivity had improved to the
point at which 760 workers could produce 125
engines a day.
Finally, India always had a poor reputation for
quality and customer focus. Pre-1991, the problem
was for consumers to find products rather than for
companies to find customers. Reflecting on this era,
Kalyani remarked: “The concept of quality used to
be that if it works somehow, it’s okay, but it doesn’t
need to work all the time.” Clearly, this had to
change if Indian brands were going to compete not
just with each other but also against the
multinational companies entering the country.
Focusing on core businesses The highly diversified
Indian business groups quickly realized that they
needed to focus on a few industries in which they
could obtain leading domestic positions. Building
these positions would require significant investments.
Focusing the portfolio would not only free up
resources from non-core companies, but, through
their divestment, would also generate additional
capital for the core business. In the early 1990s,
many large business groups in India went through
an exercise of identifying their core businesses. For
example, RPG Enterprises went from 20 to six areas.
In 1998 even Tata reduced the number of group-
affiliated companies from 80 to 30 by trimming its
lines of business from 25 to a dozen.
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With the opening of the economy and the easy entry of
foreign players into the Indian market, domestic Indian
companies realized that they must scale up to remain
competitive.
→
The focus on a few core areas allowed
companies to consolidate their domestic positions
and had a subtle impact on their aspirations. Firms
were no longer satisfied by claiming that they were
number one or two in India; instead they began
touting their world ranking. For example, MRF
started asserting it was among the top 15 tyre
manufacturers in the world, while Ranbaxy
emphasized its position among the top 10 generic
pharmaceutical producers in the world. Slowly but
surely, Indian companies began benchmarking
themselves against world competitors. It was a first
step toward global ambitions for Indian firms.
Strengthening management In a populous country
with relatively few opportunities in the corporate
world, Indian companies never saw managerial
talent as an important source of competitive
advantage. Compensation levels were extremely 
low. In the 1980s, it was not surprising for top
executives to earn as little as $5,000 per year.
Relationships, loyalty and trust were valued in
professional managers more than talent and
competence. This was especially true in family-
owned firms: many critical positions were occupied
by family members. This explains the common
usage of the term “professional manager” in India
to distinguish such a leader from the “owner
manager” and family members.
Often these family firms were run on feudalistic
norms whereby all important decisions had to flow
through a powerful promoter. This frustrated
competent professional managers, and their only
options were the few Indian subsidiaries of multi-
national companies. Some of these multinational
companies, such as Unilever and Imperial Tobacco,
recognized that managerial talent was available in
India at a relatively low cost and raided their Indian
subsidiaries for overseas operations.
Post-1991, Indian firms, especially the family
business houses, realized that professional
managers had value as they could take
responsibility and deliver results. Not surprisingly,
firms began to scour the Indian subsidiaries of
multinational companies for management talent 
and move away from “one-person” rule. In the
ensuing war for talent, professional manager
salaries shot up dramatically. Beyond that, variable
pay and stock options were introduced. In addition
to competing for the best talent, managers were
empowered and firms began investing in their
training. Today, Indian managers, relative to their
peers in other countries, probably have the highest
standard of living in the world. These managers
brought the world-class practices and processes
they had learned at multinational companies to
Indian firms, thereby preparing Indian business to
be globally competitive.
2001–now: India unleashed
The corporate restructuring brought confidence to
Indian business. Indian companies transformed
themselves from domestic players, scared of global
competitors and constantly seeking government
protection in domestic markets, into confident
players capable of building Indian multinationals.
As they have gone from being passive resisters to
active promoters of globalization, Indian firms are
continuing to force a change in government policies
toward a more open Indian market and business
environment.
As late as 2001, Indian outward investment was
less than $1 billion. Instead, India, like all
developing countries, was actively courting foreign
investment into the country. By 2006, India had
reversed the trend. For the first time, Indian
outward investment of $10 billion had outstripped
foreign investment into India. The spending spree
continued unabated in 2007. Indian companies
arranged or concluded $21 billion in 40 foreign
investment deals in January and February of 2007
alone. The quest by Indian companies to be globally
competitive is the driving force behind this
accelerating foreign outward investment.
With the opening of the economy and the easy
entry of foreign players into the Indian market,
domestic Indian companies realized that they must
scale up to remain competitive. This was especially
true for those companies that operated in what are
global industries, such as aluminium, automobiles
and steel. A good example is Tata Steel’s $12
billion acquisition of Anglo-Dutch steelmaker Corus
in October 2006, which catapulted it into becoming
the world’s fifth-biggest steel producer (prior to the
acquisition, it was 56th).
The acquisitions reflect the rapid growth of the
Indian economy since 1991. When combined with
the restructuring efficiencies wrought by Indian
companies over the past 15 years, this growth has
resulted in average profit margins of around 10 per
cent, more than twice the global average. Indian
firms have been minting money. For example,
Reliance Industries, then India’s largest company,
doubled its profits between 2004 and 2006.
Growth and profits have left the Indian corporate
balance sheets in robust health, with consequently
high market capitalization. By one estimate, 60 per
cent of India’s 200 leading companies are looking
to spend their newfound wealth on foreign
acquisitions and investments. As an example,
consider Vedanta, one of India’s biggest producers
of zinc, copper and aluminium. Vedanta is the
lowest-cost zinc producer in the world. Besides
those in India, it has operations in Zambia and
Australia. In 2007, Vedanta had revenues of $6.5
billion, an increase of 76 per cent over the previous
year, and nearly half of it was profit. In the biggest
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overseas sale of shares by an Indian company at
that time, 20 per cent of the group’s flagship
company, Sterlite Industries, was floated in 2007
on the New York Stock Exchange for over $2 billion.
Besides enabling high-profile deals, burgeoning
profits are encouraging many smaller Indian firms to
seek foreign acquisitions. The result is that Indians
have already emerged as second only to Americans
as foreign employers of Britons. Tata alone employs
nearly 50,000 people in the UK. 
Global powerhouses
Indian global powerhouses, until recently, never had
the confidence or the ability to be on the world
stage. Forged in India’s harsh environment, these
companies are now increasingly seeking to secure
the best of both worlds – access to the lucrative high-
margin markets of the developed world by owning
companies in Europe and the United States while
maintaining their low-cost bases in India. Today, 
the remarkable thing that strikes one about Indian
companies is that they have massive aspirations to
be global companies, and they are extraordinarily
confident about acquiring foreign firms and
integrating them with their companies in India.
While it is only to be expected that some of these
Indian acquirers will stumble because they have
either paid too much or taken on large amounts of
debt, the overall trend remains unaffected. For the
developed world and its companies, the era of India
as a major overseas investor is here. The question is
not how to stop this trend but how to deal with it.
There was a time when Westerners assumed that an
Indian in the head office of a multinational or
Western company was either an accountant or a
computer nerd. Nowadays that person is just as
likely to be the boss.
It is important to see India’s evolving competitive
advantage as more than simply low costs and a
steady supply of call centre employees. As costs in
India are going up, both Indian companies and
Western multinationals are increasingly using India
as a destination for high value and technologically
sophisticated projects. HCL Technologies, the
Indian outsourcing company specializing in research
and development, is signing up big aerospace
customers such as Boeing and EADS. The company
was heavily involved in the development of Boeing’s
787 Dreamliner by designing two mission-critical
systems – one to avert airborne collisions, the other
to land in zero visibility. Ian Q.R. Thomas, president
of Boeing India, was quoted as saying, “In theory,
we could place the work anywhere. We’re here
because we found a level of sophistication.” 
Almost every Fortune 500 company is setting up 
(or considering setting up) operations in India that
will be integral to its global value chain. 
The rush by multinationals to set up Indian
operations and the rapid growth of Indian out-
sourcing companies has resulted in a war for talent.
Only in India would T.V. Mohandas Pai, Infosys
Technologies’ chief financial officer for 12 years and
member of the Infosys board of directors, make a
career change to take over as head of human
resources at Infosys! But the company hires 25,000
people a year, and its growth is dependent on
attracting and retaining the best talent.
Such competition requires a fundamental shift 
in the mindset of multinational companies about
the role of Indian talent. They need to confront 
the question: why should an Indian join a
multinational instead of an Indian firm? In many
multinationals, the local Indian operations are
viewed as peripheral rather than central to the
parent company’s global agenda. As a result,
knowledge, capabilities and people flow from the
headquarters in the United States, Europe, or Japan
to India – but rarely vice versa. There is no career
track for the Indian employee in the company’s
global operations. In contrast, at Infosys, TCS and
Wipro, the potential recruit can become the CEO of
the firm and lead global operations. Unfortunately,
only a handful of multinationals – Citibank,
McKinsey and Unilever being notable exceptions –
have grappled with the dilemma of remaking the
talent management processes in face of the
changing global workforce realities.
The other war is for customers and business
models. Indian outsourcing companies started from
a low-cost basis but are slowly moving up the
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Today, the remarkable thing about Indian companies is
that they have massive aspirations to be global companies,
and they are extraordinarily confident about acquiring
foreign firms and integrating them with their companies 
in India.
food chain to more sophisticated projects.
Companies like Infosys, Satyam Computer Services,
TCS and Wipro are starting to challenge the Western
multinationals, such as Accenture, EDS and IBM,
head-on for the high-value global consulting deals.
These Western IT consultancies are starting from a
high-cost structure and are using their Indian back-
office operations to move to lower cost structures,
while Indian outsourcing companies are making
small acquisitions in the West to add to their front-
end consulting capabilities.
The Economist in 2008 asserted, “India counts
as one of liberalization’s greatest success
stories . . . without India’s strength, the world
economy would have had far less to boast about.”
India as one of the fastest-growing economies
seems like a paradox in a country where everything
(especially the traffic, courts and bureaucratic
machinery) seems to move at a snail’s pace.
Regardless, with its neighbour China, India is where
future growth and profits for multinational
companies lie.
Yet many global companies have been slow to
respond to this shift in the locus of world
opportunity to Asia. An analysis of several large
Western firms found that, although an estimated 34
per cent of the potential market for their goods is in
Asia, the region accounted for only 14 per cent of
sales, seven per cent of employees, five per cent of
assets, three per cent of research and development
and two per cent of their top 200 people. Moreover,
it found that these disparities were growing larger.
Coming off a flight from London to India, one is
struck by the obvious enormous infrastructure
challenges. Yet one feels invigorated by the
country’s uplifting burst of energy and new dreams.
India is, of course, not alone in this enthusiasm; 
it can also be observed in China, Dubai, Moscow
and Vietnam. We are at a historical inflection point.
We cannot visualize the specific changes; but these
places will be unrecognizable in a decade, and 
they will help remake the global political and
economic landscape.
It is sometimes frustrating to explain these
changes to many Americans and Europeans, who
are usually unable to see them through their now-
obsolete lens on the world. Imagine in 1900 having
to stand in front of a British audience and predict
that the world was entering the American century.
The audience would have considered such a
prognosis mad and probably countered with
comments such as, “Do you not know the vastness
of the British Empire?” and “Have you ever been to
America and seen the problems they have?” In the
17th century, China and India accounted for more
than half the world’s economic output. After a
pause, the pendulum is swinging back to them at a
speed the West has not yet grasped.
Despite the countries’ many challenges, this is
going to be the China and India century. How else
do you explain the gloomy feeling at the board
meeting of an Indian company in which annual
revenues had grown by only 35 per cent? Or, that
Naresh Goyal, founder and chairman of Jet Airways,
India’s largest private airline, is sincere when he
declares: “I want to produce a global Indian brand.
That’s the passion for me, that’s what drives me.
The people of this country, we have the capability to
produce a global brand.” Jet Airways does not wish
to compete on price, but on service, against its
more established competitors. A recent search on
Expedia for business-class direct-return flights from
London to Toronto served up British Airways at
£2,357 and Jet Airways at £4,471!
The concepts, constructs and mind-set that have
prevailed over the past century need to be
transformed as a new future, with India and China
as dominant powers, comes into play. It is why
Jeffrey Immelt, CEO of General Electric, sent the
list of the 100 largest emerging-market companies
to his underlings, ordering them to identify the
companies GE could sell to and buy from as well as
those it would have to compete with. 
Japan’s geographical location has given the
country a front seat to the developments of the last
decade. Traditionally, it looked down on the rest of
Asia after it became the first Asian country to
achieve Western levels of economic development.
Recently, overshadowed by India and China, it has
become more insecure. Today, Japanese bookstores
are filled with titles such as Extreme Indian
Arithmetic Drills and The Unknown Secrets of the
Indians. Indian education is in fashion as Japanese
parents in Tokyo rush to enrol their children in
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Economic growth has had a significant impact on the
reduction of poverty levels. Within two decades, between
1985 and 2005, the percentage of the population living 
on a dollar a day was reduced by almost half.
English-language schools taught by Indians and
other Asians. The thought of viewing another Asian
country as a model in education would have been
unheard of a few years ago. In contrast, riot police
had to quell protests by Dutch school students in
2007, when the government decided to increase
their annual classroom hours by 26.
Support for free trade is falling as people in the
developed world feel more alarmed than charmed by
globalization. In a 2007 Pew Global Attitudes poll,
the United States placed dead last out of 47
countries in the percentage of the population
supporting free trade. These ambivalent feelings
toward globalization are also seeping into popular
Western culture. The 2008 French movie Summer
Hours, directed by Olivier Assayas, is about a
successful French couple working abroad. In an
interview, the director was nostalgic but realistic
when he observed: “It is not their own logic that
takes them away from home, it is the logic of 
the world today. If you are young and successful,
you look towards India or China.... The world is
changing in Russia, China, India, the Middle
East . . . it’s like an earthquake. They are absorbing
all the energy. You don’t feel that sense of change
in Europe.”
Surveys of developed countries in 2008 show
historic lows with respect to outlook for future living
standards. The 2008 financial crisis only reinforces
the fact that that growth is in the East and debts
are in the West. As a result, the fears expressed in
the West for its economic future are diametrically
opposite to the confidence and desire to succeed
one observes in India.
The New York Times columnist Roger Cohen
provocatively wrote: “It’s the end of the era of the
white man. By 2030, India will probably overtake
Japan as the world’s third-largest economy behind
the United States and China. But in the end,
transformation is not about numbers. It’s about the
mind. Come to Asia and fear drains away.” ■
Reprinted by permission of Harvard Business Press.
Excerpted from India’s Global Powerhouses: How
They Are Taking On the World. Copyright © 2009
Nirmalya Kumar; All Rights Reserved.
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